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Abstract
In this paper we study European banks’ demand for short-term funds (liquidity) during the
summer 2007 subprime market crisis. We use bidding data from the European Central Bank’s
auctions for one-week loans, their main channel of monetary policy implementation. Through
a model of bidding, we show that banks’ behavior reﬂects their cost of obtaining short-term
funds elsewhere (i.e., in the interbank market) as well as a strategic response to other bidders.
We ﬁnd considerable heterogeneity across banks in their willingness to pay for short-term funds
supplied in these auctions. Accounting for the strategic component is important: while a na¨ ıve
interpretation of the raw bidding data may suggest that virtually all banks suﬀered a dramatic
increase in the cost of obtaining funds in the interbank market, we ﬁnd that for about one
third of the banks, the change in bidding behavior was simply a strategic response. Using a
complementary dataset, we also ﬁnd that banks’ pre-turmoil liquidity costs, as estimated by
our model, are predictive of their post-turmoil liquidity costs, and that there is considerable
heterogeneity in these costs with respect to the country-of-origin. Finally, among the publicly
traded banks, the willingness to pay for short-term funds in the second half of 2007 are predictive
of stock prices in late 2008.
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11 Introduction
When the subprime credit crisis hit the Euro money market in August 2007, banks’ cost of obtaining
short-term uncollateralized loans increased sharply.1 In Figure 1, we plot the spread between the
(1-week) EURIBOR2, a measure of interbank uncollateralized rate, and the (1-week) EUREPO,
the rate for fully collateralized loans on the interbank market.3 After the second week of August
2007, the gap between these rates signiﬁcantly widened: the premium a lender required for an
unsecured loan in the interbank market after August 2007 increased from around 4 basis points to
well over 10 basis points for loans with a one-week maturity.4
In response to similar liquidity problems in the United States, the Federal Reserve System
signiﬁcantly expanded and diversiﬁed its facilities for providing liquidity. On the other side of
the Atlantic, the European Central Bank exploited an already existing tool within its operational
framework, its weekly “repo auctions”.5
For many ﬁnancial market participants seeking access to liquidity, repo auctions of the central
bank were an attractive option: the collateral requirements were less strict and (market clearing)
interest rates were signiﬁcantly lower than for unsecured loans in the interbank market. To obtain
a loan at the EUREPO rate in the post-turmoil period, the collateral had to be virtually risk-free –
basically just high-quality government paper.6 Therefore, for many potential borrowers the better
option might have been to obtain liquidity by participating in the auctions run by the central bank
1On August 9, 2007 BNP Paribas announced its decision to freeze three investment funds with exposure to high-
grade segments of the U.S. subprime home-loan market. The combined value of the funds was e1.59 billion ($2.19
billion) (Wall Street Journal, August 10-12, 2007).
2EURIBOR, Euro Interbank Oﬀer Rate, is a daily reference rate based on the averaged interest rates at which
banks oﬀer to lend unsecured funds to other banks in the euro interbank market.
3 Loans at EUREPO have strict requirements on the type and quality of the collateral.
4In this paper, we focus mainly on one-week maturity rates as this is the maturity of the regular repo operations
of the ECB. However, even more dramatic jumps in the unsecured-secured spread occurred for longer maturity loans.
We analyze loans with 3-month maturity in section A.4. Not only did the spreads increase, but the set of securities
that were acceptable as collateral in the interbank market also became much smaller, which renders the repo rate
not directly comparable (see e.g., the BearingPoint Report, 2008).
5It is interesting to note that in the U.S. during the early stages of the crisis (2007H2) it was the Federal Home
Loan Bank System, not the Federal Reserve System, which was the main provider of liquidity support to U.S. ﬁnancial
institutions. For example, as documented by Ashcraft, Bech and Frame (2008) Washington Mutual (which failed
on September 25, 2008) received liquidity support in Q4 2007 amounting to about $64 billion representing 20% of
its total assets. Countrywide ($48 billion in Q4 2007) and Wachovia ($42 billion in Q4 2007) also were among the
institutions that received liquidity support from the FHLB System in 2007.
6For a list of eligible collateral, see http://www.eurepo.org/eurepo/eurepogc.html
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Figure 1: Spread between the unsecured and secured lending rates
where the collateral requirements were not as stringent.7
This paper analyzes unique data on bidding behavior in the repo market in an attempt to shed
some light on the turmoil that started in August 2007. Our work complements prior inﬂuential
analyses of this crisis by Taylor and Williams (2008, 2009), Michaud and Upper (2008), Wu (2008),
and McAndrews, Sarkar and Wang (2008) among others8, who have focused on the spread between
the secured (collateralized) and unsecured lending rates in the interbank money market.9 These
papers report a large jump in these spreads beginning in August 2007, and analyze the impact of
various central bank actions on subsequent yield spreads.
While yield spreads paint a useful picture of the market-level impact of the liquidity crisis,
7Even in the U.S., the Federal Home Loan Bank System accepted mortgage-backed securities as collateral for its
advances to ﬁnancial institutions.
8See Section 2 for a more detailed literature review.
9These studies also look at the spread between the overnight interest swap rates and unsecured lending rates.
The correlation between these spreads and the secured/unsecured spread is very high, as documented by Taylor and
Williams (2008). We ﬁnd this in our data as well: a regression of the overnight swap rate (EONIA SWAP)/unsecured
(EURIBOR) rate spread and the secured(EUREPO)/unsecured(EURIBOR) spread has coeﬃcient 1.05(t = 15.96),
with R
2 = 0.84, which is similar to the results reported by Taylor and Williams (2008) for U.S. equivalents.
3and could be used as a “temperature gauge” for assessing the health of credit markets, it is not
possible to assess the heterogeneity of the impact of the crisis across the banking system without
access to information on individual banks’ funding costs. The ability to assess the heterogeneity
of the impact of the crisis on individual banks is very important in order for the policy makers to
ﬁnd and implement any cost-minimizing solution. Unfortunately, obtaining high-frequency data
on individual banks’ borrowing costs is diﬃcult, because most interbank transactions take place
on an over-the-counter basis, or through anonymized trading. Bank-level data from ECB’s repo
auctions provide us with a unique opportunity for understanding the distribution of the severity
of the liquidity crisis across the banking sector. Every week, the ECB auctions loans with 1-week
maturity to banks who oﬀer the highest interest rates and are willing to put up the appropriate
collateral that will be repurchased10 after the loan matures. In Section 5 below, we provide a
simple economic model to link the participating banks’ willingness-to-pay for ECB loans in the
repo auctions to their outside options of procuring liquidity through the (unsecured and/or secured)
interbank markets. We then use new structural econometric methods developed in the multi-unit
auction literature to estimate banks’ willingness-to-pay for ECB loans from their bids. We should
emphasize that, unlike the Fed, the ECB does not have supervisory/regulatory authority over
European banks. Such powers are exercised by national central banks and/or regulation agencies.
However, the ECB can advise national central banks with regards to the “stresses” in the ﬁnancial
system. Bids at the repo auctions analyzed in this paper, and the types of regressions we run
in Section 6.5 can help the ECB fulﬁll its advisory duty by providing high frequency country or
bank-speciﬁc liquidity cost measures and analyzing their determinants.
The ﬁrst striking feature of our data is the sudden change in bidding behavior that occurred
after the turmoil. A quick glance at the aggregate bid curves11 for auctions before and after
August 9, 2007 reveals a signiﬁcant change. Figure 2 shows the aggregate bid curves (normalized
by subtracting the EONIA swap rate12). Before August 9, 2007 all aggregate bids (depicted with
10Hence the term repo auctions.
11The aggregate bid curve in an auction is simply a horizontal sum of individual bid (i.e., demand) curves submitted
by all participants in that auction.
12An “EONIA swap” is an interest rate swap transaction, where one party agrees to receive/pay a ﬁxed rate to
another party, against paying/receiving a ﬂoating rate termed EONIA (Euro OverNight Index Average), which is an
average of all actual overnight unsecured transactions.
4solid lines) were highly concentrated around the EONIA swap rate (i.e., around 0 on the vertical
axis in the graph); it is regarded as an indicator of industry expectations of the relevant market
interest rates because it can be used with overnight borrowing as an alternative to bidding in
the repo auctions. After August 9, a signiﬁcant upward shift and increased heterogeneity in all
aggregate bid curves is quite evident.
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Figure 2: Aggregate demand curves (horizontal sum of individual bid curves in an auction)
While the dramatic shift in aggregate bid curves in ECB’s liquidity auctions parallels de-
velopments in interbank markets, our analysis shows that the distinction between “bids” and
“willingness-to-pay” is very important in this market. As we illustrate in Section 4 and Section 6,
although virtually all banks’ bidding behavior changed dramatically after August 9, this does not
necessarily indicate a shift in all banks’ willingness-to-pay for ECB provided liquidity. Even if some
bidders did not experience a change in their costs of short-term funds from alternative sources, pre-
sumably because of their solid balance sheets and lack of exposure to problematic assets, these
bidders rationally would have to adjust their bids as a best-response to their “distressed” competi-
tors’ higher demand for ECB provided liquidity. That is, the shift in bids for ECB liquidity was
5both “fundamentals” based, that is based on an increase in the outside funding costs of a subset
of banks, and “strategic”, arising from the best-responses of strategic bidders in a competitive en-
vironment. Indeed, in Section 6 we show that for about one third of the participants, the observed
change in bidding behavior was simply a strategic response. Loosely speaking, while their costs of
obtaining short-term funds stayed the same, they increased their bids in order to best-respond to
the higher bids of their rivals.
As for the bidders whose willingness-to-pay for ECB provided liquidity increased signiﬁcantly
after August 2007, it is important to understand the determinants of this shift in demand. In
Section 6.4, we analyze the diﬀerences in banks willingness-to-pay for ECB loans based on their
country-of-origin in the Eurozone countries. We ﬁnd signiﬁcant heterogeneity across member coun-
tries; banks from member countries that relied less on ECB funding before August 2007 appear to
have suﬀered less from the crisis.
To further investigate what led to the shifts in demand at the bank level, we use in Section 6.5
an auxiliary dataset on a subset of banks’ credit default swap (CDS) rates and their reserve require-
ments with the ECB. We demonstrate that this increase in willingness-to-pay for ECB liquidity
is linked to a deterioration in credit/default ratings (as measured by CDS rates). We also ﬁnd
that ECB reserve requirements become a more signiﬁcant determinant of bidding in repo auctions,
which suggests that access to other liquidity sources became more diﬃcult after August 2007. In
Section 6.6 we further ﬁnd that banks’ willingness-to-pay for ECB loans in the second half of 2007
predicts the change in publicly traded banks’ stock prices between December 2007 and 2008, af-
ter the “second” liquidity crisis spurred by Lehman Brothers’ collapse. This suggests that bids in
ECB auctions contain private information about banks’ ﬁnancial well-being that is not immediately
impounded into their stock prices.
Another result of our analysis is that in the period beginning in August 2007, the previously
stable relationship between the banks’ implied willingness-to-pay and reported interbank rates
broke down. In particular, on several occasions after the turmoil, the market clearing interest
rate for collateralized loans issued through the primary auctions (which constitutes a lower bound
on the willingness-to-pay for the marginal bank under normal circumstances) was higher than the
6reported interest rate for the unsecured loans issued in the interbank market. This suggests that the
reported unsecured interest rates (EURIBOR in the EURO context) failed to reﬂect the “actual”
unsecured borrowing rates (or true market prices) that were faced by a large number of banks in
the EURO area. This criticism of LIBOR13 rates induced the British Bankers’ Association (BBA)
to publish the consultative paper “Understanding the construction and operation of BBA LIBOR
– strengthening for the future” on June 10, 2008. In section 6.3.1 we pursue several explanations
for and implications of this decline in the informativeness of reported market rates.
From a broader perspective, our results suggest that the evolution of banks’ willingness-to-pay
for liquidity may be useful for policymakers with questions. While many such questions may be
answered with balance sheet data, its reliability and its low frequency render the readily available
data from bidding in weekly liquidity auctions far superior. Recent rapid advances in multi-unit
auction theory and in empirical methods for modelling auction markets allow us to recover the
willingness-to-pay directly from the bids.14
We now move on in section 2 to describing the growing literature on the ﬁnancial turmoil,
providing context for the rest of our paper. We describe the primary repo auctions of the ECB in
Section 3; in Section 4 we describe our dataset taken from these auctions and summarize several
interesting facts that these data reveal. In Section 5 we sketch a simple model, and we use our data
in conjunction with our model to recover bidders’ willingness-to-pay for ECB loans. For interested
readers, in Appendix A.2 we review a more detailed model of a discriminatory auction of a perfectly
divisible unit good, its equilibrium characterization, and the estimation method that we proposed
in our previous work. In Section 6 we present the main results of our estimation and discuss some
implications of our ﬁndings. Section 7 concludes. (Appendix A.1 is devoted to more details about
the way the ECB conducts its monetary policy and its operations.)
13LIBOR, London Interbank Oﬀer Rate, like EURIBOR, is a rate for unsecured interbank loans.
14See Athey and Haile (2005) or Hendricks and Porter (2007) for surveys of recent advances in empirical methods
and Milgrom (2004) for an excellent auction theory overview.
72 Turmoil in the Literature
The signiﬁcance of the ﬁnancial crisis is perhaps best illustrated by the number of internet blogs
by top economists15 devoted to it. In winter 2009, most of the Journal of Economic Perspectives
was devoted to the ﬁnancial crisis. Coval, Jurek and Staﬀord (2009) talk about the contribution
of structured ﬁnancial products to the crisis when the correlation of defaults is ignored. Mayer,
Pence and Sherlund (2009) describe the evolution of mortgage defaults in recent years. Brunner-
meier (2009) provides a nice discussion of the origins of the ﬁnancial crisis. He ties together the
worsening balance sheets of ﬁnancial institutions due to dropping asset prices, drying up of the
lending channel as banks become worried aboud access to funds, the associated fear of bank runs,
and the network eﬀects arising from ﬁnancial institutions being both lenders and borrowers. Cec-
chetti (2009) describes the early stages of the crisis from the viewpoint of the central bank. He
points out the increase in interest rate spreads and describes several actions that the Fed took in
order to ﬁght the crisis.
Some recent papers (for example Taylor and Williams 2008, 2009) have argued that this increase
in the spread between the term16 swap rates used to proxy the expectations of overnight lending
rates of ﬁnancial market participants and the rates for unsecured term loans is probably caused by
an increase in the counter-party risk. In particular, after the news about the extent of highly risky
subprime loans among securities with highest ratings held by many banks in their portfolios, there
was a sudden shift in the probability of default. Looking at the diﬀerence between the secured and
unsecured loan rates, Taylor and Williams argue that the increase in spread indeed seems to be
due to this eﬀect.17
While the evidence for the increased spread is very convincing, it is less clear whether this
increase is due to counter-party risk or liquidity risk, that is due to the reluctance of banks to lend
liquidity in the secondary market because of their own uncertainty about future liquidity needs.
15For example, Bob Hall’s blog, or many articles on Mankiw’s or Becker & Posner’s blog.
161-week rates for example.
17As is the case of the U.S., the secured (EUREPO) and overnight swap rates (EONIA SWAP) are highly correlated
in the Euro area. Taylor and Williams (2009) argue that both rates are close to being riskless, and could be considered
close to perfect substitutes. Although it is a collateralized rate, there is some risk in EUREPO due to potential
problems in the delivery or return of collateral. EONIA swaps are subject to some risk, in that one of the parties
may default and the remaining party is subject to the diﬀerential in the ﬁxed and overnight components of swap. In
our data, EURIBOR-EUREPO spreads and the EURIBOR-EONIA spread are almost perfectly correlated.
8In fact, some papers (e.g., Wu 2008) argue that the increased spread is due to the liquidity risk
stemming from increased uncertainty about future liquidity needs of each bank, which in turn
increases banks’ reluctance to lend longterm.
In a short article, Chari, Christiano and Kehoe (2008) argue that, while there is clear evidence
of a ﬁnancial crisis, some of the often cited sources of this crisis, including the tougher access
to liquidity in the interbank market, are not consistent with publicly available aggregate data.
Cohen-Cole et al. (2008) point out that the aggregate ﬁgures may be missing a lot of details, but
Christiano (2008) disagrees on the whole with their arguments. In this paper we show that by
looking at aggregate data a researcher indeed might miss the relevant changes in the structure of
liquidity demands: while the total demand may have stayed the same, many banks substituted from
the secondary (interbank) market to the primary one, and the collapse of the secondary market
may have important implications for allocative eﬃciency and credit availability. The increased
heterogeneity of values for liquidity in the post-turmoil period, and the failure of the interbank
market to lead to an eﬃcient allocation of liquidity among banks, then render the primary auctions
(or open market operations) of the central banks crucial in improving the performance of the
liquidity markets by correcting the misallocation.
Bidding data from repo auctions of the ECB have been studied previously in Bindseil, Nyborg
and Strebulaev (2005). They describe many interesting details of this market and compare these
auctions to those of Treasury bills by studying auctions between June 2000 and June 2001. Among
other things, they argue that the common value component seems much less important in the
central bank repo auction than in T-bill auctions, which substantiates our using the private-values
framework. Unlike them, we adopt a structural modeling framework that aims at non-parametric
identiﬁcation of the primitives. A similar approach was used in Horta¸ csu and Kastl (2008) to analyze
Canadian T-bill auctions or in Chapman, McAdams and Paarsch’s (2006) analysis of Canadian
Receiver General auctions of cash. While the setting Chapman et al. analyzes is the closest to
ours, the objective of their analysis is quite diﬀerent. Their main interest lies in investigating
whether bidders’ behavior in these auctions is consistent with best-response assumptions. They
ﬁnd that violations of best-responses are frequent, but the extent of these violations is so minimal
9(in terms of the expected payoﬀ lost) that assuming that bidders indeed play best-responses may
not be a bad idea. Our approach is to assume that bidders play best-responses. Our goal is to
use the estimated model to analyze the forces behind bidders’ choices and to analyze the impact of
the ﬁnancial turmoil by studying the link between the willingness-to-pay in the repo auctions and
alternative sources of funding.
3 Primary Auctions of Liquidity in the EURO Area
In this paper we focus on the auctions of liquidity, which are part of the Main Reﬁnancing Op-
erations (MROs)18 of the ECB. They are auctions of collateralized loans with one-week maturity,
conducted every week. The main function of the MROs (at least before the turmoil period) is to
provide liquidity to the market. They are pivotal in steering interest rates (through the minimum
bid rate, MBR), to manage liquidity in markets, and to signal the stance of monetary policy.
Before each auction, a bank that wants to participate will submit bids specifying the rate and
the quantity it is willing to transact with the ECB to the NCB19 of the member state where the
institution is located (has a head oﬃce or branch). The bids of an institution may be submitted
by only one establishment in each member state. Banks may submit bids for up to ten diﬀerent
interest rate levels; hence, a bid in these auctions can be thought of as a demand function. The
ECB then collects the bids and determines the maximum rate at which the demand weakly exceeds
the supply. All bids for higher rates are satisﬁed and demands at the marginal rate are rationed
proportionally. During the time span of our dataset the ECB has used only the discriminatory
auction format, but it has the right to change the mechanism at any time. All winning bidders
thus had to pay their full bids (i.e., rates) for the allocated liquidity.
After each auction, the ECB publicly reveals this about the outcome: % marginal (market
clearing) bid rate, allotment at marginal rate, total amount allotted, weighted average allotment
rate, total number of participating bidders, minimum rate of all bids, and maximum rate of all bids.
No additional data that would provide information on demands by individual banks are revealed.
The loans obtained in these auctions have to be collateralized. In particular, banks are expected
18See section A.1.2 in the appendix for more details.
19National Central Bank
10to cover the amounts allotted to them with a suﬃcient level of eligible assets (collateral).20 Penalties
can be applied by the NCBs in case of a failure to deliver the collateral. The eligible collateral
is broader than collateral generally accepted for loans at the EUREPO rate on the interbank
(secondary) market, even more so after the turmoil. Nevertheless, the ECB applies valuation
haircuts as risk control measures.
Table 1 shows the relative weight for the categories of eligible assets used by Eurosystem coun-
terparties. It illustrates that banks tend to substitute illiquid collateral (ABS; uncovered bank
bonds) for highly liquid collateral (government bonds).21 This trend accelerated after the turmoil
with a sharp increase in Asset Backed Securities; however, it reﬂects a medium-term development
that has been ongoing for a while and is not strictly related to the turmoil.
Table 1: Structure of Collateral Pledged Against the MROs
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Central government securities 0.52 0.50 0.48 0.46 0.42
Regional government securities 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03
Uncovered bank bonds 0.12 0.14 0.16 0.17 0.20
Covered bank bonds 0.16 0.15 0.14 0.12 0.11
Corporate bonds 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.08
Asset-backed securities 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.08 0.09
Other marketable assets 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.05
Non-marketable assets 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02
With this relevant background, we are ready to describe our dataset in detail and go on to
estimate a model of bidding in the repo auctions.
4 Data
Our unique dataset consists of all submitted bids in 50 regular discriminatory (pay-your-bid) repo
auctions of liquidity provided via collateralized loans with 1-week maturity conducted as part of
the regular MROs of the ECB between January 4, 2007 and December 11, 2007.
Table 2 oﬀers some important summary statistics of the full sample. On average, there are 341
participating bidders (banks) in an auction. There are 733 unique bidder-identities, which suggests
20See section A.1.3 in the appendix for detailed discussion of eligible collateral.
21See also Ewerhart and Tapking (2008)
11that only about one half of potential bidders participate in any given auction. Participants submit
bids with very few steps (price-quantity pairs): only 1.66 on average. The banks on average demand
about 1 billion EUR at 3.94%, which is about 4 basis points higher on average than the EONIA
rate.
Table 2: Data Summary
Summary Statistics
Auctions 50
Mean St.Dev. Min Max
Bidders 341 28 273 395
Submitted steps 1.66 1.02 1 10
Price bid 3.94 0.22 3.50 4.36
Price bid spreada 0.04 0.07 -0.17 0.41
Quantity bid 0.004 0.012 3 ∗ 10
−6 0.18
Issued Amount (billions e) 259.89 52.77 155 330.5
a Spread against EONIA rate.
Table 3 illustrates the change in means and standard deviations following the turmoil of August
2007. The most striking diﬀerences are the increase in the number of steps in each bid (from 1.47
to 2.02), the decrease in the amount of liquidity oﬀered for sale (from 292.34 to 202.19 billions
EUR) and, most importantly, the increase in the spread between the bids and the EONIA rate
(from 0 to 10 basis points). Recall that in a discriminatory auction, a bidder would do best if she
knew the market clearing rate beforehand and thus was able to submit a single bid equal to that
rate for an amount at which her marginal value equaled the rate. Therefore, the ﬁrst diﬀerence
likely reﬂects the fact that the bidders were much less certain where the market would clear and
so submitted ﬁner bids.22 An alternative potential explanation for this phenomenon might be that
some bidders simply needed to make sure that they received at least some minimal level of liquidity
in the primary market; therefore, they submitted inframarginal bids for which they were willing to
pay a premium over the market clearing rate. Both of these explanations also may be consistent
with the observed increase in the spread between the bids and EONIA. To distinguish between
these two potential explanations, we would need to know the marginal value of that bidder at the
time of placing the bids. Obtaining estimates of these marginal values thus is one of the main goals
22Figure 13 shows that there is a clear ﬁrst-order stochastic dominance relationship between the empirical cumu-
lative distribution functions before and after the turmoil.
12Table 3: Data Summary: Before and After August 2007
Summary Statistics
Mean Std Dev
Before After Before After
Bidders 348.6 328.1 20.88 34.37
Submitted steps 1.47 2.02 0.73 1.34
Price bid 3.80 4.13 0.20 0.06
Price bid spreada 0.00 0.10 0.02 0.08
Quantity bid 0.004 0.005 0.009 0.014
Issued Amount (billion e) 292.34 202.19 1.42 4.51
a Spread against EONIA rate.
of this article.
After August 2007 the bids become much more dispersed, as shown by the aggregate bid curves
depicted with dashed-dot lines (-.) in Figure 2. In each auction the aggregate bid curve also
becomes much steeper relative to the aggregate bid curves before the turmoil, which are depicted
as solid lines. We hypothesize that access to aﬀordable loans in the secondary market became
much tougher for some banks; this also can be thought of as an outward shift in the marginal
value for the liquidity obtained in the primary market. This may be due to the above mentioned
increase in the counter-party risk. There is however another potential source that emerged during
the turmoil, stemming from the lender’s uncertainty about its future liquidity needs, and leading
to unwillingness to lend in the longterm interbank market.23 The latter uncertainty is related to:
the inherent diﬃculty for banks to evaluate even their own assets; uncertainties related to potential
drawings from committed credit lines; set-backs in securitization programs; and, in extreme cases,
potential bank runs (by depositors and/or investors) triggered by rumors.24
23Similar incentive to keep liquid assets exists in Holmstrom and Tirole’s (1998) model of liquidity. In their model
enterpreneurs who want to continue a project to a later stage might ﬁnd themselves sometimes with insuﬃcient
returns in the intermediate stage and thus might have a need for liquid assets to keep the project aﬂoat.
24In a recent paper, Tapking and Eisenschmidt (2008) provide a simple theoretical model for the liquidity risk
premia in unsecured interbank transactions which tries to address this channel.
135 Model and Estimation Framework
In order to obtain estimates of the marginal values that would rationalize the observed bids, we turn
to a model of bidding in these discriminatory auctions. Consider ﬁrst the following simple model of
bidding in the primary auction, which links the estimated marginal values to the secondary market
secured and unsecured interest rates. Suppose bank i has a liquidity need (possibly due to a reserve
requirement, to improve its balance sheet, or to close a funding gap) of Ri. This must be fulﬁlled
through three alternative channels: 1) ECB primary auctions, 2) unsecured interbank lending, or
3) secured interbank lending.25,26
We assume that these methods are perfect substitutes, but access to them is limited based on
collateral availability. In particular, bank i has Ki ≤ Ri units of collateral that is acceptable by the
ECB, and Li ≤ Ki units of collateral acceptable by secured interbank lending counterparties. The
anecdotal evidence is that, after the subprime crisis, Li became noticeably less than Ki. Bank i faces
an interest rate of ui in the unsecured interbank market and si in the secured interbank market,
where ui > si. In our application, we assume that {Ri,Ki,Li,ui,si} are independent (conditional
on variables commonly observed by banks) across banks. The marginal value for obtaining liquidity
in the auctions run by the ECB therefore can be thought of as shown in Figure 5. A bank with
liquid collateral suﬃcient to cover its needs should not have higher value than si; a bank that has
no collateral that can be pledged in the interbank repo market should have a marginal value at the
bank-speciﬁc unsecured rate ui. For a bank with collateral that is partially liquid (for example,
one that requires substantial haircuts if used in the interbank repo market), the marginal value
should be between ui and si. Later in our application we will work with quantity weighted average
25We abstract from other ways of obtaining liquidity. Managing the maturity mismatch between assets (long-term)
and liabilities (short-term) is the essence of banking. Before the crisis, a variety of instruments allowed banks to fund
their assets without major constraints. Short-term funding was available in the form of interbank loans, issuance of
Certiﬁcate of Deposits (CDs), and central bank reﬁnancing; longer-term funding was available from bond issuance
(covered or uncovered) and through securitization. The securitization and the interbank funding channels were among
the most severely disrupted sources of liquidity immediately after August 2007. Bond issuance without government
guarantees also was impaired.
26 The interbank market operates to a large degree as an over-the-counter (OTC) market, for which (to the best of
our knowledge) there is hardly any transaction-level data that could be used for our purposes. The impact of liquidity
shocks and other frictions on prices in OTC markets has been studied in Duﬃe, Gˆ arleanu and Pedersen (2007).
Their model of the OTC market is based on the search and bargaining model proposed in Duﬃe, Gˆ arleanu and
Pedersen (2005), which provides conditions under which asset prices are adversely aﬀected by frictions in the OTC
market, such as increased diﬃculty to ﬁnd a counterparty.
14marginal value which, by the above arguments, should be a convex combination of si and ui. Thus
we deﬁne a parameter, αi, as the weight on the secured rate: a bank with high α has a lot of liquid
collateral, as α → 0, the bank’s usable collateral in the interbank market also approaches zero.
Figure 3: Marginal Value for Liquidity in ECB Auctions
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5.1 Model of Bidding and Econometric Framework
In the previous section we provide a simple theory of the origin of banks’ marginal valuations for
ECB loans.27 We now describe how banks will bid in the auctions. The ECB allows bidders to
place multiple price/quantity bids: in eﬀect, bidding demand schedules. Therefore, our model is
based on Wilson’s (1979) share auction model, in which bidders compete for one unit of a perfectly
divisible good, submit demand curves and their choice of quantity is continuous. We view this
model as appopriate for our setting because the amount of credit to be sold in each auction is over
e2 billion and the minimum bid increment is only e100,000.
Kastl (2008) analyzes a variant of Wilson’s model with bidding in step functions, which is
also the appropriate modiﬁcation for our application. He proves that there exists an equilibrium
of a discriminatory auction in distributional strategies in this constrained game when signals are
27See Ewerhart, Cassola and Valla (2009) for an alternative theory model with more detailed discussion.
15independent and price is assumed to be continuous. He provides its characterization via a set
of necessary conditions for each step k at which the marginal valuation function is continuous in
q given by (1) below. The model and its assumptions are formally spelled out in the appendix
section A.2 .
v(qk,si) = bk +
Pr(bk+1 ≥ pc|si)
Pr(bk > pc > bk+1|si)
(bk − bk+1) (1)
Equation (1) is the main identiﬁcation equation in our analysis; it simply describes the equi-
librium relationship between bids and values. In our earlier discussion, we tied these values to the
bank’s “outside options” of procuring liquidity through secured and unsecured interbank markets.
The intuition for the underlying trade-oﬀ is quite similar to that of the single-unit ﬁrst-
price auction. The intuition can also be seen when we rewrite the optimality conditions as
Pr(bk > pc > bk+1|si)(v (qk,si) − bk) = Pr(bk+1 ≥ pc|si)(bk − bk+1). This equation states that the
marginal loss of surplus due to decreasing the demand at price bk whenever the kth step is the
marginal step in i’s demand (and thus the market clearing price must be between bk and bk+1)
should be traded-oﬀ against the possible gains when the kth step is inframarginal (and thus the
market clearing price must be weakly lower than bk+1). Thus, by shifting some demand to the
subsequent (k+1)st step, we would decrease the payment by the diﬀerence between the bids (times
the quantity shifted). It is important to emphasize that the necessary conditions given by (1) have
to hold at each step k. Therefore, we do not need to directly model the choice of the number of
steps, ˆ K (si), that bidder i submits. If signals were independent, the probabilities in (1) would not
be conditional on si because knowing one’s signal would not be informative about the distribution
of rivals’ signals, but of course the probabilities would still be a function of the submitted bid curve.
Since, in practice, the continuity in q of the marginal valuation function might be questionable
at the last step, we use the optimality equation with respect to bid given by equation (A-3) in the
appendix to identify the marginal value corresponding to the last step in a bid function.
Using these necessary conditions, we nonparametrically obtain point estimates of the marginal
values at submitted quantity-steps using a resampling method as described in our earlier work.28.
That resampling method is based on simulating diﬀerent possible states of the world (realizations
28See Horta¸ csu and Kastl (2008) for formal treatment of the estimation and Athey and Haile (2005) for a recent
survey of nonparametric estimation techniques for auction data.
16of the vector of private information) using the data available to the econometrician, thus obtaining
an estimator of the distribution of the market clearing prices. It works as follows:
Suppose there are N potential bidders that are (ex ante) symmetric. Fix a bidder’s bid. From
the observed data, draw (with replacement) N −1 actual bid functions. This simulates one possible
state of the world from the perspective of the ﬁxed bidder – a possible vector of private information
– and thus results in one potential realization of the residual supply. Intersecting this residual
supply with the ﬁxed bid, we obtain a market clearing price. Repeating this procedure many
times, we obtain an estimate of the full distribution of the market clearing price conditional on the
ﬁxed bid. Using this estimated distribution of market clearing price, we can obtain our estimates
of marginal values at each step submitted by the bidder whose bid we ﬁxed using (1).
Horta¸ csu and Kastl (2008) show that this estimator is asymptotically normally distributed and
well-behaved, so its asymptotic distribution can be approximated by bootstrap, which is also how
we obtain standard errors in this application.
5.1.1 Supply Uncertainty
In the pre-turmoil period the actual amount of liquidity allocated in the auction by the ECB diﬀered
only slightly from the pre-announced supply, but as Figure 18 illustrates the deviations became quite
substantial in the post-turmoil period. We assume that bidders rationally expected the ECB to
deviate from the announced benchmark. To incorporate this feature into our estimation framework,
we use the empirical distributions of deviations from the pre-announced supply in the pre- and post-
turmoil period. At each iteration of our resampling algorithm, we resample independently from
the corresponding empirical distribution of supply deviations. Appendix A.3 provides more details
about the way supply is determined in the weekly repo auctions.
5.1.2 Asymmetric bidders
Because one of the goals of this paper is to identify bidders (banks) that likely have been hit harder
by the ﬁnancial turmoil than their rivals, in the sense that their value for liquidity obtained in
the primary market increased, the assumption that all banks are ex-ante symmetric might not be
17appropriate and might bias the results. We adopt instead an iterative procedure and estimate
an asymmetric model with two groups of banks as follows: in the ﬁrst step, we estimate the
model assuming ex-ante symmetry of bidders. In the second step, we use the estimated values
to ﬁnd a subset of bidders who experienced an increase in their estimated values for liquidity in
the post-turmoil period. Recall that one of our goals is to separate bidders experiencing ﬁnancial
distress, which is captured in our model as a shift in the distribution of marginal values, perhaps
in the sense of ﬁrst-order stochastic dominance, but also possibly accompanied by a shift in the
support. There are many ways to check for this shift, and the test we use is based on comparing
means of the distributions before and after turmoil for each bidder. This test is operationalized by
separately regressing the quantity-weighted average of the marginal value estimates (normalized
by EONIA to take out the level eﬀect of interest rates29) on the turmoil dummy for each bidder.
If the estimated coeﬃcient on the turmoil dummy is signiﬁcant at 5% level – i.e., if the mean
marginal value increased – we classify this bidder as one who experienced ﬁnancial distress in the
post-turmoil period. In the third step of our algorithm, we re-estimate the model using the two
groups of bidders. The resampling method is modiﬁed to allow for two groups of bidders that are
symmetric within a group, but not necessarily across the groups. In the fourth step, we again
estimate the subset of bidders that experienced an increase in their values by using the estimates
from the asymmetric model. If this subset coincides with the two groups used in step 3, then we
stop; otherwise, we repeat step 3.30 In practice, we stop the algorithm when weakly less than 5
bidder identities switch groups.31 We are able to classify 482 bidder identities out of the 733 in our
data. The remaining bidder identities do not submit bids both before and after the turmoil.
29See Piazzesi (2003) for a thorough discussion of the recent literature on the structure of interest rates.
30While we do not have a formal proof of whether this method converges, if it does, it is easy to see that the
resulting estimates are consistent estimates of the primitives of the asymmetric model. In the actual application, it
turns out that after very few iterations, the two groups of bidders are very stable – both in terms of size and in terms
of identities of bidders contained in each. The asymmetry therefore seems not to play as important a role in the
estimation stage, which is probably due to the large number of participants. We also experimented with a random
initial assignement of bidders into the two groups; after very few iterations, we obtained virtually the same bidder
groups as those arrived at when starting with the symmetric model.
31Varying this criterion has virtually no eﬀect on the estimated marginal values.
186 Results
The change in bidding behavior documented in Figure 2 is not necessarily a direct consequence
of the turmoil having made it harder to access liquidity in the interbank market. In fact, two
eﬀects are at play. First, for some banks the primary market may have become the main source of
liquidity, and thus their value for liquidity oﬀered in these primary auctions may have risen, which
in turn may have caused an upward shift in their individual bid curves. Second, when some bidders
change their bidding strategies because of a change in their values for the auctioned good, it is very
likely that in equilibrium all other bidders will change their bidding strategies too, because they
need to be playing best responses against a diﬀerent set of bidding strategies. Thus our ﬁrst goal
is thus to separate the strategic adjustment eﬀect – i.e., bidders adjusting their bidding strategies
in response to changes in the strategies of their rivals – from the eﬀect of changing values, which
indeed might signal ﬁnancial distress for a bank. To achieve this, we estimate the model of bidding
outlined in Section 5 and described in more detail in Appendix A.2.
Figures 4 and 5 depict a randomly chosen bidder with the associated estimated marginal values
for two auctions, one before and one after the turmoil. We can make two interesting observations:
1) the quantity that this bidder demanded increased substantially, from less than 2% of the supply
before the turmoil to over 3% of the supply after the turmoil32; and 2) this bidder likely wanted
to be fairly certain that she is allocated at least 3% of the supply after the turmoil, because her
bid for that amount substantially exceeded the eventual market clearing price (by 4 basis points)
– moreover, her marginal value decreased by about 2 basis points between her highest and lowest
bids after turmoil. Recall that if a bidder knew with certainty that the market would clear at a
price p∗ in a discriminatory auction, then the optimal bidding strategy would be to submit only
one bid at this price, and for a quantity such that the marginal value of the expected allocation
after rationing would be equal to p∗. Finally, notice that the estimated marginal value before the
turmoil is just slightly higher than the EONIA swap rate (which corresponds to 0 on the vertical
axis). This suggests that buying the ﬁxed leg of the SWAP and borrowing overnight was indeed an
32Recall that the supply declined by about one third after the turmoil, which makes the demand increase perhaps
not as large, but still an increase of 0.3 percentage points of the supply demanded post-turmoil amounts to about
e600 million.
19option for many banks. After the turmoil, though, the estimated marginal values were signiﬁcantly
above the EONIA swap rate, suggesting that this particular bank valued the liquidity obtained in
the repo auctions of the ECB more, perhaps because its access to the EONIA rate may have been
limited, and/or it did not have enough high-quality collateral to participate in the collateralized
interbank market to obtain loans at the EUREPO rate. This change in values, and thus indirectly
the implied ability of an individual bank to access liquidity in the interbank market, would be
missing if we were to analyze aggregate data, such as in Chari, Christiano and Kehoe (2008).






















































Figure 4: Bid and Estimated Marginal Value (Before Turmoil)
Overall, we ﬁnd a profound eﬀect of the August 2007 turmoil on marginal valuations that
bidders attach to liquidity oﬀered for sale in the primary markets. Figure 6 illustrates this eﬀect in
more detail. The solid lines depict estimated aggregate (i.e., horizontal sum of) marginal valuation
curves before the turmoil (normalized by subtracting the EONIA swap rate), and the dash-dotted
lines (-.) depict the estimated aggregate marginal valuation curves after the turmoil of August
























































Figure 5: Bid and Estimated Marginal Value (After Turmoil)
2007. It is apparent that an outward shift in marginal values (towards north-east) has taken place,
suggesting that, at least for some bidders, the liquidity provided in the primary market became
very valuable relative to the period before August 2007.
To further illustrate this eﬀect, consider Figures 9 and 10 which depict the aggregate bid curves
and aggregate marginal valuation curves for two auctions, one before and one after the turmoil.
Again, it clearly illustrates that the EONIA swap rate which played a role of a reference point
for bidding in the pre-turmoil period, most likely no longer served this role after the turmoil.
More importantly, the amount of shading (the area between the aggregate marginal value and the
aggregate bid curves) increased substantially in most auctions. For example, at the market clearing
price (i.e., where the vertical line at Q = 1 intersects the marginal value and bid curve), the amount
of shading in Figure 9 is less than 1 basis point, whereas it increases to almost 3 basis points in
Figure 10. This is a consequence of the change in the slope of the aggregate bid curves and hence






































Marginal values in auctions
 
 
Marg val − EONIA (Before: −, After: −.)
Figure 6: Estimated Aggregate Marginal Valuation Curves
of increased market power of marginal bidders and/or uncertainty about the market clearing price.
More importantly, in auction 32 before turmoil, the bidding is concentrated on the EONIA and
repo rates and the market clears at exactly the repo rate. After turmoil (in auction 44), neither
EUREPO, EONIA, or EURIBOR seem to be a focal point of bids. Moreover, the market clears at
signiﬁcantly above all three rates.33
6.1 Identiﬁcation of “Distressed” Bidders
Figure 7 depicts the estimated quantity-weighted average marginal values in each auction nor-
malized by subtracting the corresponding EONIA swap rate (a very similar pattern obtains if we
subtract the EUREPO rate). The emerging pattern again suggests that the (normalized) marginal
values for liquidity provided in the primary market increased substantially following the turmoil
33Since the goal of the ECB is to target the overnight interest rate, of which the 1-w EONIA swap rate is an
expectation, this suggests that the ECB might have faced some problems with achieving its objectives in the post-
turmoil period.
22in August 2007. In fact, it still seems to be increasing, in the most recent auctions in our data
reaching over 20 basis points premium over the EONIA swap rate. Even more importantly, the
marginal values have become quite heterogeneous, which is evidenced by the increased slope.






























































Average Marginal Values − EONIA
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Figure 7: Quantity-weighted average marginal values (across all bidders)
Having estimated the marginal values for each bidder before and after the turmoil, we now can
look for the eﬀect of the turmoil on these values. In particular, we regress the quantity-weighted
estimates of marginal values for each bidder on a turmoil dummy. Figure 8 plots the histogram of
the signiﬁcant coeﬃcients from these regressions. For almost 100 bidders, the (normalized) marginal
values have risen by more than 20 basis points in the post-turmoil period. This exercise reveals
another important point: the turmoil seemed to be accompanied by an increase in marginal value
for liquidity in the primary market for about two thirds of the participants, whereas the remaining
one third experienced no signiﬁcant increase. Our conclusions might be quite diﬀerent if we based
the analysis solely on bids. Running the same type of regressions, but using quantity-weighted
bids (again normalized by EONIA) rather than marginal values would result in a signiﬁcantly
positive relationship for virtually all bidders. Table 4 shows that the predictions diﬀer for over
2320% of the banks. Given the amounts that often are mentioned in connection with helping the
struggling banking sector, whether 20% of banks seem to be healthy or not potentially might be
quite important.








Histogram of significant coefficients on turmoil dummy
Figure 8: Histogram of Signiﬁcant Turmoil Eﬀects




Values Yes 326 5
No 96 55
As a placebo test of the last exercise, we also tried focusing exclusively on the time period
before the turmoil (we observe 32 auctions before the turmoil in our data) and splitting this subset
of data into two halves, before and after auction 16. Regressing bids and values, respectively, on
a dummy for auctions 16 − 32 results in data on both bids and values showing no eﬀect for 398
banks; exhibiting a signiﬁcant eﬀect for 6 banks; and for 19 and 20 banks, respectively, they seem to
have been signiﬁcantly aﬀected based either on bids or on values data, but not both. This exercise
24suggests that the diﬀerence in predictions based on values and bids reported in Table 4 appears
likely not to be by chance. In fact, it suggests that the turmoil had an important eﬀect, causing
signiﬁcant changes in bids for most banks, but with the underlying values actually changing only
for a smaller subset of banks.
Figure 15 shows a histogram of participation for bidders for whom the turmoil eﬀect on marginal
values is signiﬁcant and larger than the median signiﬁcant eﬀect. It clearly demonstrates that the
most signiﬁcantly aﬀected bidders also are the most frequent participants in these auctions. The
same pattern emerges when we look at participation in the pre-turmoil period only.
On the other hand, Figure 16 shows that bidders whose values have not been signiﬁcantly
aﬀected by the turmoil exhibit fairly uniform participation. On average, such a bidder participates
in about 23 auctions out of 50 in our sample, with the median participation level being 24.
6.2 Degree of Shading
As we have seen, the turmoil in the ﬁnancial markets increased the variability of both bids and
marginal values. Because there was more variation in bidding strategies, uncertainty about where
the primary market would clear also increased. Using our estimates of marginal values, we now
examine how the turmoil aﬀected the degree of shading, where shading is deﬁned as the diﬀerence
between the marginal value and the bid. Using our estimates, the average amount of shading over
the entire sample period was about 6.6 basis points with a standard deviation of 20 basis points.
Looking at shading before and after the turmoil provides a diﬀerent picture, though. In particular,
the mean shading before the turmoil was only about 4 basis points with a standard deviation of 11.5
basis points. After the turmoil, the mean shading increased to 11.2 basis points with a standard
deviation of 30.5 basis points.
The increased variability of shading supports our ﬁnding that some bidders likely were aﬀected
by the subprime crisis signiﬁcantly more than others. Regressing estimated shading on the turmoil
dummy reveals that the turmoil resulted in a signiﬁcant change in the amount of shading for 99
bidders. For 7 bidders, shading decreased by an average of 2 basis points, while for the remaining
92 bidders, it increased by over 18 basis points on average.
























Figure 9: Aggregate Bid and Estimated Aggregate Marginal Values Curve (Before Turmoil)
6.3 Bidders’ Marginal Valuations and Secondary Market Rates
Our application also is naturally suited to subjecting the estimates from the structural model to a
quick reality check. In particular, as Section 5 suggested, the values (bid plus markup) of each bank
should lie between the fully unsecured lending rate (riskiest) and the risk-free rate whenever these
rates reﬂect the true market clearing prices. We will use EURIBOR as the unsecured lending rate
and EUREPO as the risk-free rate, because only the highest quality collateral (such as government
treasury bills) may be used against loans obtained at this rate.34 Indeed, in Figure 9 the estimated
marginal values for the most part are bounded from above by the EURIBOR rate and from below
by EUREPO. This suggests that the estimates produced by our structural model are reasonable.
In many auctions in the post-turmoil period, however, this relationship fails (see Figure 10). In
particular, as ﬁgure 11 illustrates, there are many auctions that clear at rates that are above the
unsecured rate (EURIBOR), which suggests that this is not the rate at which any bank can borrow.
We use our estimates to ask what αi’s would make the convex combination of the secured rate,
34Results are similar if we use the EONIA SWAP rate instead of the EUREPO.










































Figure 10: Aggregate Bid and Estimated Aggregate Marginal Values Curve (After Turmoil)
EUREPO, and the unsecured rate, EURIBOR, equal to the estimated values. For this, we use the
(quantity-weighted average) estimates of bid+markup/marginal values. This hypothetical exercise
thus assumes that everyone can get a loan at the reported unsecured rate, which is highly unlikely. If
that were the case, then our estimates should lie between 0 and 1; yet we quite often obtain negative
values of α. This suggests that the unsecured interest rate which would rationalize banks’ marginal
value in the primary auction lies above EURIBOR – the reported unsecured rate – suggesting that
these banks could not borrow at this rate, a fact that we will further conﬁrm in Section 6.3.1.
Restricting attention to α ∈ (−1,1) and taking the mean of αi across all bidders pre-turmoil, we
get 0.17, with a median of 0.29. In the post-turmoil period, the average α decreased to −0.01, and
the median to −0.02, which suggests that the average bank did not have usable collateral in the
interbank market, and that many banks could not borrow unsecured at EURIBOR, either.
A more interesting ﬁnding obtains, however, when we decompose these changes in the hypo-
thetical collateral structure based on our classiﬁcation of bidders: the ones that we labeled as
ﬁnancially distressed after the turmoil (because of a signiﬁcant increase in marginal values) see a
change in mean αi from 0.18 to −0.02, and the median αi decreases from 0.28 to −0.04. This
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Figure 11: EUREPO, EURIBOR and primary auction clearing rates
suggests that the bidders who we label as signiﬁcantly aﬀected indeed suﬀered from a big hit in
the way that their collateral pool was valued in the secondary market. In fact the “non-distressed”
bidders’ mean α in fact even increases slightly from 0.466 to 0.474, but the median decreases from
0.18 to 0.10.35
In our second exercise, we abandon the assumption that everybody can get a loan at the
unsecured interest rate and instead directly compare the estimated vi’s and the published secured
and unsecured rates at the time of the auction. We normalize our results by dividing by the
number of auctions (since we have 32 auctions pre-turmoil and 18 post-turmoil). Averaging across
all auctions, we have 156 bidders per auction whose values exceed the unsecured interest rate,
EURIBOR, and 184 whose values fall short of it. We ﬁnd that before turmoil, about 138 bidders
have values higher than the reported EURIBOR, which suggests that even before turmoil not every
35Recall that we were able to classify only 482 bidders (out of the total of 733 identities appearing throughout our
sample). While we have estimated αi for the remaining bidders and estimated their marginal values whenever they
submitted a bid, they did not submit bids both pre- and post-turmoil, and therefore our procedure cannot classify
them. This explains why the reported means of the insigniﬁcantly and signiﬁcantly aﬀected bidders lie above the
overall mean of α across all bidders.
28bank was able to borrow at the reported unsecured rate. After turmoil, this number increases by
almost 40% to 189 bidders per auction! Given that on average there are slightly more than 330
participants in an auction, this means that over 50% of the participating bidders cannot transact
at the published EURIBOR. Again decomposing this increase, we ﬁnd that among the signiﬁcantly
aﬀected bidders, the number increased from 92 to 137, while for the insigniﬁcantly aﬀected bidders
it actually decreased slightly from 34 to 33. Similarly, the number of bidders whose estimated
marginal value falls short of the unsecured rate, vi ≤ u, drops from 209 pre-turmoil to 138 post-
turmoil. This change is due mainly to changes among the bidders who have been signiﬁcantly
aﬀected by the turmoil: there are 158 such bidders per auction pre-turmoil and only 93 post-
turmoil, whereas among the insigniﬁcantly aﬀected bidders the drop is only from 38 to 34.
We also can compare estimated marginal values with the secured rate in the secondary market,
s (EUREPO). By doing this, we ﬁnd that for over 322 bidders in an auction, vi ≥ s (325 pre-turmoil
and 318 post-turmoil), while for only 18 bidders the reverse is true. This suggests that s indeed
places a lower bound on the marginal value of liquidity obtained in the primary market.
6.3.1 Does the EURIBOR provide an accurate view of interbank lending?
As we found earlier, many of the marginal valuations, especially in the post-turmoil period, suggest
that the EURIBOR is not representative of the unsecured interest rate at which many banks can
borrow. Indeed, we have even more direct evidence for this from the fact that several auctions in
the latter part of our sample cleared above the EURIBOR. Figure 11 is a clear indication that there
must have been excess demand for uncollateralized loans at the EURIBOR rate. Thus, evaluation
of policy actions based on levels or changes of secured and unsecured interest rates (such as Taylor
and Williams 2008 and 2009, and Wu 2008) may be more problematic than it initially appears.
The main source of the problem is that the rates used may not necessarily reﬂect market clearing
prices and, moreover, might not even be comparable over time when a crisis such as the subprime
turmoil hits the economy.
Because the EURIBOR (or its counterpart, LIBOR) also play a crucial role in anchoring most
of the consumer loans, such as mortgages, it is important to understand why this rate may have
29failed to reﬂect a market clearing price. The ﬁrst potential explanation is that the EURIBOR is not
actually a market clearing rate by virtue of its construction. Indeed, the EURIBOR is not based on
actual transactions, but rather on a survey of a subset of banks: “A representative panel of banks
provide daily quotes of the rate, rounded to two decimal places, that each panel bank believes one
prime bank is quoting to another prime bank for interbank term deposits within the euro zone.”
Note that the EURIBOR is based on the declared beliefs of banks regarding market transactions,
and that the rate pertains to transactions between a selected group of banks with superior credit
ratings. Thus, in times of uncertainty, it is likely that the EURIBOR will not accurately represent
the unsecured loan rates available to a large number of non-prime banks.
A second and related explanation is that of a market failure in the form of credit rationing at-
tributable to increased informational asymmetries after the turmoil, as in the model of Stiglitz and
Weiss (1981). We thus might expect rationing of unsecured loans at the reported rates, with the
unfulﬁlled demanders seeking liquidity at the ECB repo auctions instead. However, the market for
unsecured loans may have failed to function for reasons other than informational asymmetries, es-
pecially because credit rationing equilibria typically are diﬃcult to generate quantitatively (Arnold
and Riley, 2008).36
All of these factors suggest that the EURIBOR probably is not a reliable indicator of the severity
of demand shifts in the money markets. In the next section, we will use the disaggregated bidding
data to analyze the demand shifts in more detail.
6.4 Cross-country diﬀerences in banks’ marginal values
Our data allows us to identify the country-of-origin for the bidders in our dataset. Although we
are not allowed to report the identities of countries, we can investigate whether banks in diﬀerent
countries in the Euro system were aﬀected diﬀerently by the crisis.
36Brunnermeier (2009) argues that the troubles in the interbank lending market in 2007 are due to the precautionary
hoarding by individual banks. He argues that banks funding highly leveraged investment funds (which bet on asset-
backed securities) became more worried about these funds drawing on their credit lines. This increased each bank’s
uncertainty about its own liquidity needs. At the same time, banks became more uncertain as to whether they could
rely on the interbank market, because it was not known to what extent other banks faced similar problems. Thus the
supply of liquidity decreased and the demand for liquidity increased at the same time, driving up interbank rates.
However, although this provides an explanation as to why the EURIBOR-EUREPO spreads increased, it does not
explain why the primary auction rate for secured loans exceeded the EURIBOR rate.
30In Figure 12, we plot the mean α values across bidders before and after the crisis by country.
Recall that α is close to 1 if a bidder’s marginal value for ECB loans is close to EUREPO, the
interbank secured interest rate, and close to 0 if the bidder’s marginal value is the EURIBOR,
the interbank unsecured interest rate. An α value that is negative indicates that the bidder has
marginal value above the reported EURIBOR; i.e. the bidder cannot satisfy its funding needs at
the EURIBOR rate.
In the ﬁgure, we see that there is considerable heterogeneity across countries, both pre and
post-crisis. First notice that pre-crisis, some countries’ banks have α values close to 1, while others’
banks have α values close to zero (and, in one case, slightly negative). There is high positive
correlation between pre- and post-crisis αs; the Pearson correlation coeﬃcient is 0.9. After the
crisis, α values appear to have declined across the board, with the low α countries’ banks being
pushed into the negative α zone.
Because of non-disclosure requirements, we cannot investigate how country characteristics, es-
pecially attributes of their respective ﬁnancial systems, are correlated with the funding costs of
their banks. However, the exercise above may be instructive, in that α values are quite highly
correlated before and after the crisis: the countries whose banks are likely to suﬀer are those whose
banks had high liquidity funding costs to begin with.
6.5 Sources of bidders’ private values
We motivate our model with private values by arguing that banks’ values for liquidity obtained in
the primary market likely are driven to a large extent by the collateral value of each bank’s asset
portfolio and by the private information each bank has about its liquidity position, i.e., its need to
satisfy the prescribed reserve requirements. To test these assumptions, we complement our dataset
and our estimates of marginal values with additional detailed bank-level data for a subsample of
banks. In this exercise we use three types of data: (1) data that is common to all banks and
speciﬁc to each tender – the one-week Eurepo rate37; (2) bank-speciﬁc data, which is publicly
available, for example bank’s CDS and asset sizes; and (3) non-public bank-speciﬁc data, including
volumes allotted at ECB’s long-term reﬁnancing operations (LTRO), banks’ current accounts with
37See Piazzesi (2003) for an argument about why it is important to control for the levels of interest rates.




















Figure 12: Pre and Post-Crisis Marginal Values across Euro-zone Countries
the national Central Banks (NCBs), and reserve requirements.38 In the following we project our
estimates of marginal values on these variables (or their functions), accounting for their panel
structure in various ways.
Now we brieﬂy summarize which eﬀects we expect from each variable included in the analysis
that follows. As mentioned earlier, the one-week Eurepo rate normally sets a ﬂoor for bid rates (if
it is above the minimum bid rate) and marginal values because it measures the cost of “alternative”
funding in the secondary market against highly liquid collateral. Thus this rate sets the common
ﬂoor level for the bids and marginal values for all banks.
The (relative) CDS premium captures the impact of credit risk premia in the inter-bank market;
higher values of this variable should lead to an increase in the bids and marginal values of liquidity
38The source for these data are: Bloomberg (bank assets); ECB (DG-M/MOA: current accounts; DG-M/FO:
LTROs and MROs bidding data); Reuters (Eurepo rate); and KMV (CDS).
32at the central bank auctions. We use the CDS on the day before each auction, and deﬁne a
relative credit default swap variable as the bank’s CDS minus the average of all banks’ CDS, in





Volumes allotted at the LTROs captures the impact of term liquidity funding pressure. With
a liquid interbank lending market, the term-liquidity that a bank receives from the central bank
(LTROs) should have little or no impact on the marginal value for liquidity in the short-term
auction (MRO). However, if the ECB becomes the primary funding source for a bank, then we
might expect a noticeable link between the two auctions. Accordingly, our LTROoutit variable
measures the outstanding volume of loans obtained in LTROs that bank i owns in week t (in billion
e).
The reserve deﬁciency is calculated from banks’ current accounts with the NCBs: the marginal
value of liquidity should increase in the amount that a bank has to accumulate until the end of the
reserve maintenance period. A bank’s reserve deﬁciency varies with unexpected liquidity shocks,
which may be driven by unexpected mismatches between cash inﬂows and outﬂows from that bank’s
accounts; it also may reveal the failure to guarantee a targeted allotment at a previous auction.
The Deﬁciency variable is calculated for each bank i as follows. First:




where Dit is the accumulation of reserves needed to fulﬁll its requirement until the last day of
the reserve maintenance period for bank i on day t. RRi is the daily average reserve requirement
of bank i (set by the ECB at the beginning of each reserve maintenance period) and T is the
number of days in the maintenance period; T −t is the number of days until the end of the reserve
maintenance period. If a bank follows a smooth (linear) reserve fulﬁlment path, it targets as its
daily current account the daily average reserve requirement D∗
it:
D∗
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A bank is said to be front-loading its reserve fulﬁlment path if Deficiency < 0; it is back-
loading if Deficiency > 0. The frontloading liquidity policy followed by the ECB after August
2007 should have led to an average negative value of Deficiency. We use the Deficiency value on
the day before the MRO. This is a normalized variable that has a days-in-the-reserve maintenance
period dimension.
Finally, Turmoil is a dummy variable equal to 1 in the post-turmoil period. We also included
interactions of all variables with this dummy.
We estimated Fixed Eﬀects (FE) and Random Eﬀects (RE) Panel Data Models. The estimates
for the speciﬁcation with Eurepo 1-week and the alternative interest rate measures as explanatory
variables are reported in Table 5 below.39
We performed the Breusch-Pagan test (for speciﬁcation (1) in Table 5). The random eﬀects
model is not rejected at the 5% level; however, it is rejected at the 10% level. The results reported in
the table suggest that the estimates from an RE and FE models are qualitatively and quantitatively
very similar. The estimates show that the Eurepo 1-week rate does very well at explaining the level
of marginal values before the turmoil. Indeed, because the constant term is insigniﬁcant, our model
predicts highly concentrated bidding before the crisis at rates between the Eurepo 1-week rate and
a level 3 basis points above it. Marginal values increased signiﬁcantly after the crisis. Liquidity
shocks (captured by deﬁciency) have a positive and statistically signiﬁcant impact on marginal
values only after the crisis. The impact of the outstanding volumes in LTROs is not statistically
signiﬁcant for marginal values either before or after the crisis. Nevertheless, the change in sign on
these coeﬃcients pre- and post-turmoil might suggest that LTROs substitute for MROs before the
turmoil, but are a complementary source of liquidity in the post-turmoil period. The credit risk
variable (measured by the relative CDS) is statistically signiﬁcant. A bank with CDS above the
39Since not all banks participate in every auction, we also used a two-step Heckman selection model (Heckman
(1976, 1979)). The estimates obtained with correction for sample selection are very similar to those obtained with
FE and RE and can be obtained upon request.
34Table 5: Analysis of Marginal Values
Marginal Value













Turmoil 1.53∗∗ 2.28∗∗∗ 1.36∗∗ 1.70∗∗
(0.77) (0.65) (0.67) (0.77)
Deﬁciency 0.000008 0.00017 -0.0001 -0.003
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Deﬁciency*Turmoil 0.0226∗∗∗ 0.0226∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗ 0.024∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
LTROout -0.006 -0.005 -0.006 -0.013
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.01)
LTROout*Turmoil 0.009 0.008 0.01 0.016
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.01)
RCDS 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.0005
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
RCDS*Turmoil 0.006∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗ 0.0059∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0018)
Constant -0.08 -0.04 -0.1 -0.09
(0.14) (0.14) (0.13) (0.14)
Observations 690 690 690 690
Random eﬀects 19 19 19
Fixed eﬀects 19
Within R2 0.74
a Speciﬁcations (1)-(3): Bank random eﬀects GLS regression
b Speciﬁcation (4): Bank ﬁxed eﬀects regression
c Standard errors clustered at the bank level in parentheses.
* Signiﬁcant at 10% level.
** Signiﬁcant at 5% level.
*** Signiﬁcant at 1% level.
35average tends to have higher marginal valuations for liquidity. The liquidity and credit risk factors
seem to only partially capture the increase in the spread between marginal valuations and the
reference rate (Eurepo 1-week) after the crisis, because the turmoil dummy variable is signiﬁcant
even when these variables are added to the regression. These results are robust to changing the
reference rate in the regression, as shown by the diﬀerent speciﬁcations40. We also performed a
Hausman test to check for equality of the coeﬃcient estimates of the RE and FE models. We failed
to reject the hypothesis that the coeﬃcients are equal across the two models (p-value of 0.33).
In order to assess the economic signiﬁcance of the results, we calculated the predicted diﬀerence
between the marginal valuations for two banks under the following assumptions: Eurepo rate 1-
week at its highest in-sample value (4.15%); one bank with CDS diﬀerential at highest in-sample
value (44.64); the other bank at minimum sample value (-30.91); one bank with deﬁciency at highest
in-sample value (21.22 days); the other bank at zero. These assumptions are intended to capture
the hypothetical situations of “good” and “bad” banks in the sample. The FE model predicts a
marginal value of 4.07% for the “good” bank and a marginal value of 5.05% for the “bad” bank,
that is a whole percentage point diﬀerence in short-term funding costs across these two banks. Note
that in relative terms, after the crisis the Eurepo 1-week rate “explains” only 52% of the marginal
valuation, the deﬁciency 9%, the CDS diﬀerential 6%, and the turmoil dummy 33%.
6.6 Relationship between marginal values and the evolution of stock prices
through 2008
In the previous analysis, we linked the marginal values that we recovered from the bidding behavior
in the primary repo auctions to the credit rating and reserve deﬁciency of each bank. We argued
that banks that are more “sound”, i.e., that have healthier balance sheets and thus easier access
to alternative sources of funding than simply the primary markets (and thus access to loans at
or close to the low secured EUREPO rate) are less pressured to bid aggressively. Thus, their
implied marginal values are lower. On the other hand, if a bank is observed whose marginal values
increased substantially after the turmoil, perhaps it could be linked to some underlying problems
that this bank might be facing. For the small subset of our bidders (19), for which we were able
40The same results were obtained when estimating the ﬁxed-eﬀects models with diﬀerent interest rates.
36Table 6: Correlations between changes in stock prices, marginal values and CDSs
∆ Stock Price ∆ CDS Price ∆ Marginal Value ∆ MV Spread
∆ Stock Price 1
∆ CDS Price -0.75 1
∆ Marginal Value -0.46 0.37 1
∆ MV Spread -0.25 0.05 0.84 1
to obtain stock prices and prices of credit default swaps from Compustat and Datastream, we use
these data to look at the relationship between three variables: “∆ Stock Price,” deﬁned as the
diﬀerence between the mean prices in the ﬁrst half of 2007 and the mean prices in the year and half
following the turmoil (August 2007-December 2008), normalized by the mean price pre-turmoil;
similary deﬁned “∆ CDS Prices”; and the diﬀerence between the mean quantity weighted marginal
value before and after the turmoil. The raw correlations between the change in the stock prices,
changes in marginal values, and the changes in the prices of CDSs indeed provide evidence for our
interpretation of an increase in marginal values suggesting distressed banks. As Table 6 shows, the
correlation is negative for stock prices, marginal values, and spreads of marginal values of EONIA
swap rate. This suggests that the higher the increase in marginal values pre- and post turmoil, the
bigger the decline in stock prices post turmoil. Because the prices of credit default swaps directly
reﬂect the default risk, their increase also is accompanied by a decline in stock prices, and they are
positively correlated with the diﬀerence in marginal values.
Our sample is not big enough to draw deﬁnitive conclusions.41 However, it points towards a
link between the change in the stock prices, which captures the information about the ﬁnancial
soundness of each bank becoming public information, and the change in marginal value for liquidity
obtained in the primary market, which captures the at-that-point private information of each bank
relevant to its alternative sources of liquidity.42
41While a simple linear regression of the change in (estimated) marginal values on the change in stock prices results
in a negative coeﬃcient that is statistically signiﬁcant, the same regression with the independent variable being the
change in (estimated) spreads results in a negative, but insigniﬁcant coeﬃcient.
42The same correlations hold for changes in marginal values in LTROs.
377 Conclusion
We used an economic model of bidding in the ECB’s main reﬁnancing operations to recover par-
ticipant banks’ marginal valuations for ECB provided short-term loans, which also can be linked
to the banks’ outside funding opportunities in the interbank market. Our econometric approach
allows us to decompose into two main eﬀects the dramatic upward shift in banks’ bids beginning in
August 2007: a “fundamental” eﬀect linked to a genuine increase in demand for ECB loans because
of dwindling funding opportunities elsewhere, and a “strategic” eﬀect, in which banks without a
demand shift best-respond to their competitors’ more aggressive bidding behavior. We showed that
the “strategic” eﬀect is non-negligible: while a naive analysis of bids would indicate that all bidders’
demand for short-term ECB funding increased because of the subprime crisis, accounting for the
strategic eﬀect reveals that one third of the bidders did not experience a statistically signiﬁcant
shift in demand.
Our results also shed light on the linkages between primary and secondary money market rates,
and the shortcoming of “survey” based market rate reporting. We showed that before August 2007,
participant banks’ marginal valuations were in close agreement with the EUREPO and EURIBOR:
published secured and unsecured lending rates reported based on surveys of money-center banks.
After August 2007, though, we ﬁnd that banks’ marginal valuations and, sometimes their bids for
secured ECB loans, far exceed the EURIBOR. That suggests that a large number of banks were not
able to borrow at published rates. These results together suggest that monitoring primary market
activity may allow policymakers and market observers to gain a more detailed understanding of
the depth of similar ﬁnancial crises.
The primary market activities of banks also allowed us to paint a more disaggregated picture of
the 2007 subprime crisis. We noted that there was considerable heterogeneity in banks’ willingness-
to-pay for ECB loans across diﬀerent Eurozone countries. Perhaps more signiﬁcantly, banks from
member countries that relied less on ECB funding before August 2007 appear to have suﬀered
less from the crisis. We also projected the estimated marginal valuations of banks on bank-level
covariates that proxy for the banks’ creditworthiness (as measured by the bank’s credit default
swap rates) and reserve requirements. We ﬁnd that both factors began to play a signiﬁcant role in
38banks’ bidding behavior during the 2007 crisis. Moreover, we were able to provide a quantitative
link between the rise in a bank’s CDS rate and its reserve deﬁciency and the banks’ marginal
cost of short-term funding. Finally, we showed that banks’ marginal valuations for ECB funding
during the 2007 crisis predict a portion of the decline in these banks’ stock prices throughout 2008.
Thus, primary market data contain private information about the bidders that is persistent and
not immediately reﬂected in share prices, and that potentially could be monitored as the leading
indicators for distress in crisis situations.
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42A Appendix
A.1 Institutional Background
A.1.1 Objectives and Tools of the ECB
The operational framework for monetary policy implementation by the ECB has three main ob-
jectives: signalling of the monetary policy stance, steering of very short-term interest rates, and
provision of reﬁnancing to the banking system in an eﬃcient way and under all circumstances.
The ECB has three main tools to implement its objectives: minimum reserve requirements with
averaging provision, standing facilities, and open market operations. The main focus of this paper
is on open market operations, but below we brieﬂy describe each of the three components because
all are quite relevant for banks’ behavior in the open market operations .
Reserve requirements have two main functions. They contribute to stabilise money market
interest rates and enlarge the structural liquidity shortage of the banking system. Euro area banks
have to keep minimum reserves (current accounts with NCBs43). They are computed on a lagged
accounting basis by applying a reserve ratio (currently at 2%) to the reserve base. The reserve base
includes short-term liabilities of banks (deposits and debt securities with maturity below or equal
to two years). Reserves must be kept on average over a maintenance period (averaging mechanism)
which has approximately one month duration. Required reserves are remunerated - at a rate linked
to the marginal rate of the Main Reﬁnancing Operations (MROs) described below. Current account
holdings beyond the minimum requirement are not remunerated (excess reserves).
There are two types of standing facilities, one providing liquidity (against collateral), which is
a marginal lending facility and another, absorbing liquidity, which is a deposit facility. Both are
overnight facilities taken at the discretion of the banks, and, in general, there are no limits set by
the ECB to their recourses by banks. Standing facilities have penalty rates: marginal lending +100
basis points above the Minimum Bid Rate (henceforth MBR, which is a policy rate, see below for
more details) and deposit facility -100 basis points below the MBR.44 These two rates set a corridor
for the interbank market overnight interest rate.
43National Central Banks
44The interest rate corridor was narrowed to ±50 basis points as of October 9, 2008.
43There are three main types of open market operations. The Main Reﬁnancing Operations
(MROs), which are the main focus of our analysis, The Longer Term Reﬁnancing Operations
(LTROs) are liquidity providing reverse transactions, with three-month maturity, conducted once a
month, every month. The main function of the LTROs is to provide additional longer-term liquidity
to the market. They are not intended to signal the (future) stance of monetary policy. Fine Tuning
Operations (FTOs) provide or absorb liquidity. They have neither ﬁxed frequency nor maturity.
Provision of liquidity is made via reverse transactions or foreign exchange swaps, and absorption of
liquidity is normally achieved via collection of ﬁxed term deposits or foreign exchange swaps. The
main function of the FTOs is to smooth the eﬀects on interest rates caused by unexpected liquidity
ﬂuctuations in the market. Since 2005 the ECB conducts (almost) systematically an FTO on the
last day of each reserve maintenance period.
A.1.2 More Details on the Main Reﬁnancing Operations
MROs are executed weekly according to an indicative calendar published by the Eurosystem. Nor-
mally, the announcement of the operation is on Monday45, the execution on Tuesday46 and set-
tlement on Wednesday. On the announcement day (Monday) the ECB publishes an estimate of
the average autonomous factors47 from the announcement day until the maturity of the operation
(9 days ahead forecast) as well as the benchmark allotment. On the execution day (Tuesday) the
ECB publishes a revised estimate of the average autonomous factors and benchmark amount.
As we mentioned earlier, a bid may consist of up to ten interest rates and associated quantities
a bank is willing to transact with the ECB. The interest rate bid must be expressed as multiples
of a basis point, i.e., of 0.01 percentage points. The minimum bid amount is EUR 1,000,000. Bids
exceeding this amount must be expressed as multiples of EUR 100,000. The ECB may impose a
maximum bid limit in order to prevent disproportionately large bids.
In the allotment, bids are listed in descending order of oﬀered interest rates. Bids with the
highest interest rate levels are satisﬁed ﬁrst and subsequently bids with successively lower interest
45Info in Reuters page ECB16.
46Info in Reuters page ECB17.
47Deﬁned as Autonomous factors (AF) = Net Foreign Assets (NFA) + Net Assets Denominated in Euro (NDA) -
Banknotes (BN) - Government deposits (GOV) - Other (O).
44rates are accepted until the total liquidity to be allotted is exhausted. If at the lowest interest rate
level accepted (i.e., the marginal interest rate), the aggregate amount bid exceeds the remaining
amount to be allotted, the remaining amount is allocated pro rata among the bids according to the
ratio of the remaining amount to be allotted to the total amount bid at the marginal interest rate
(a.k.a. rationining rule pro-rata on-the-margin). The amount allotted to each bank is rounded to
the nearest euro.
The ECB may apply either single rate (uniform price) or multiple rate (discriminatory) auction
procedures. So far only the latter has been used, and thus our data includes only discriminatory
auctions. In a discriminatory auction, the allotment interest rate is equal to the interest rate oﬀered
by each individual bid. Since October 15 2008 the weekly main reﬁnancing operations have been
carried out with a ﬁxed-rate tender procedure with full allotment.
A.1.3 Collateral (Eligible Assets)
All Eurosystem liquidity-providing operations (including marginal lending and intraday credit) are
based on underlying assets that must fulﬁll certain criteria in order to be eligible. A European
credit assessment framework (ECAF) has been set up in order to evaluate the eligible collateral.
The collateral accepted by the Eurosystem is very broad. Two types of assets are included in the
list: marketable and non-marketable. The ECB publishes daily a list of eligible marketable assets
on its website.48 Marketable assets must be debt instruments meeting high credit standards which
are assessed by the ECAF rules. The issuers can be central banks, public sector, private sector,
and international institutions; the place of issue must be EEA49, the place of establishment of the
issuer must be the EEA and non-EEA G10 countries, the currency must be EUR.50 Both regulated
and non-regulated markets are considered; the latter must be, however, accepted by the ECB. Non-
marketable assets are credit claims and Retail Mortgage Backed Debt Instruments (RMBD). For
credit claims the debtor/guarantor must meet high credit standards which are assessed by the ECAF
rules. The debtor/guarantor can be public sector, non-ﬁnancial corporations, and international
48Eligible assets are listed at: https://mfi-assets.ecb.int/dla_EA.htm
49European Economic Area
50Since November 14, 2008 the list of eligible marketable debt instruments was enlarged to include instruments
denominated in US dollar, yen and sterling, issued by EEA issuers.
45institutions; the place of establishment of the debtor/guarantor must be the euro area and the
currency must be EUR. Minimum size rules apply. For RMBD the asset must meet high credit
standards which are assessed by the ECAF rules. The issuers can be credit institutions; the place
of establishment of the issuer must be the euro area, and the currency must be EUR. A bank may
not submit as collateral any asset issued or guaranteed by itself or by any other entity with which
it has close links.
In the assessment of credit standard of eligible assets the Eurosystem takes into account the
following sources: external credit assessment institutions (ECAIs), NCBs in-house credit assess-
ment systems (ICAS exist in Deutsche Bundesbank, Banco de Espa˜ na, Banque de France and
Oesterreichische Nationalbank), counterparties internal ratings-based systems (IRB) or third-party
providers rating tools. The Eurosystems credit quality threshold is deﬁned in terms of a “single A”
credit assessment (meaning “A-” by Fitch or S&P; or “A3” by Moody).51 The Eurosystem con-
siders a probability of default (PD) over a one-year horizon of 0.10% as equivalent to a “single A”
credit assessment. Prudential information can be used by the Eurosystem as a basis for rejecting
assets. In countries, in which RMBDs are mobilised, the respective NCB must implement a credit
assessment framework for this type of asset. The performance of the credit assessment systems is
reviewed annualy. It consists of an ex post comparison of the observed default rate for the set of
all eligible debtors and the credit quality threshold deﬁned by the benchmark PD.
Risk control measures are applied to protect the Eurosystem against the risk of a ﬁnancial
loss if underlying assets have to be realised owing to the default of a counterparty. The following
measures are applied: i) valuation haircuts (increasing with the maturity and illiquidity of the
asset); ii) margin calls (i.e. marking to market): if the value of the underlying collateral falls
below a certain level the NCB will require the counterparty to supply additional assets or cash.
The Eurosystem may apply limits to the exposure vis-a-vis issuers/debtors or guarantors and may
exclude certain assets from use in its monetary policy operations. The last two are, however,
currently not applied.52
In pooling systems the counterparty makes a pool of suﬃcient underlying assets available to
51As of October 25 2008 and until December 2009 the ECB lowered the threshold to BBB- (except for ABS still
A-).
52Additional haircuts will be applied to all newly eligible marketable assets.
46the NCB to cover the related credits thus implying that individual assets are not linked to speciﬁc
credit operations. In an earmarking system each credit operation is linked to speciﬁc identiﬁable
assets. Assets are subject to daily valuation.
A.2 Model of Bidding in the Primary Market for Liquidity
The basic model underlying our analysis is based on the share auction model of Wilson (1979)
with private information, in which both quantity and price are assumed to be continuous.53 In
summary, there are N (potential) bidders, who are bidding for a share of a perfectly divisible good.
Q denotes the amount of liquidity oﬀered for sale by the central bank, i.e., the good to be divided
between the bidders. Q might itself be a random variable if it is not announced by the auctioneer ex
ante, or if the auctioneer has the right to augment or restrict the supply after he collects the bids.
We assume that the distribution of Q is common knowledge among the bidders. Furthermore,
the number of potential bidders participating in an auction, N, is also commonly known. This
assumption is reasonable in the context of our empirical application as all participants have to
register with the auctioneer before the auction and the list of registered participants is publicly
available. Each bidder receives a private (possibly multidimensional) signal, si, which is the only
private information about the underlying value of the auctioned goods. The joint distribution of
the signals will be denoted by F (s). We assume independent private values (IPV) paradigm.54 In
this case the si’s are distributed independently across bidders, and bidders’ values do not depend
on private information of other bidders, i.e., the marginal valuation function has the form vi (q,si).
Assumption 1 Bidder i’s signal si is drawn from a common support [0,1]
M, where M = dim(si),
according to an atomless marginal d.f. Fi (si) with strictly positive density fi(si).
53Since the main goal of this article is not to provide tools and methodology for estimating this type of models,
we refer the reader to our earlier work for more detailed discussion and analysis. The discriminatory auction version
of Wilson’s model with private values has been studied in Horta¸ csu (2002a) in the context of Turkish treasury bill
auctions. Kastl (2006 and 2008) extends this model to an empirically relevant setting, in which bidders are restricted
to use step functions with limited number of steps as their bidding strategies. The estimation of this extended model
(which is also utilized in this paper) and the relevant asymptotic behavior of the resulting estimates are described in
detail in Horta¸ csu and Kastl (2008). Several related theoretical papers on divisible good auctions, such as Ausubel
and Cramton (2002), Back and Zender (1993) or Wang and Zender (2002) focus on properties of equilibria.
54Bindseil, Nyborg and Strebulaev (2005) provide some econometric evidence that private values might be appro-
priate in case of repo auctions.
47Assumption 2 vi (q,si) is measurable and bounded, strictly increasing in (each component of) si
∀q and weakly decreasing in q ∀si.
Vi (q,si) denotes the gross utility: Vi (q,si) =
  q
0 vi (u,si)du. Bidders’ pure strategies are
mappings from private signals to bid functions: σi : Si → Y. Since in most divisible good auctions
in practice, including the liquidity auctions of the ECB, the bidders’ choice of bidding strategies is
restricted to non-increasing step functions with an upper bound on the number of steps, K = 10,
we impose the following assumption:












= dim(  q) = K ∈ {0,...,10} ,








Therefore the set Y includes all non-decreasing step functions with at most 10 steps, y : R+ →
[0,1], where yi (p) =
 K
k=1 qikI (p ∈ (bik+1,bik]) where I is an indicator function. A bid function
for type si speciﬁes for each price p, how big a share yi (p|si) of the securities oﬀered in the auction
(type si of) bidder i demands.
Finally, since bidders use step functions, a situation may arise in which multiple prices would
clear the market. If that is the case, we assume consistently with our application that the auctioneer
selects the most favorable price from his perspective, i.e., the highest price.




: TD(p) = Q, then the market
clearing price, pc, satisﬁes pc = p, where TD(p) denotes total demand at price p.
Because bidders’ strategies are step functions, the residual supply will be a step function and
hence but for knife-edge cases any equilibrium will involve rationing with probability one. Con-
sistently with our application, we only consider the rationing rule pro-rata on-the-margin, under
which the auctioneer proportionally adjusts the marginal bids so as to equate supply and demand.
48Assumption 5 The rationing rule employed is pro-rata on-the-margin, under which the rationing
coeﬃcient satisﬁes
R(pc) =
Q − TD+ (pc)
TD(pc) − TD+ (pc)
where pc is the market clearing price, TD(pc) denotes total demand at price pc, and TD+ (pc) =
limp↓pc TD(p). Only the bids exactly at the market clearing price are adjusted.
These last two assumptions, which are both consistent with our application, make sure that no
bidder would prefer to tie with another bidder when gaining strictly positive marginal surplus at
the quantity allocated after rationing.
Our solution concept is Bayesian Nash Equilibrium. The expected utility of type si of bidder
i who employs a strategy yi(·|si) in a discriminatory auction given that other bidders are using
{yj (·|·)}j =i can be written as:












i (Q,s,y(·|s)) > qk)(qk − qk−1)bk
−
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i (Q,s,y(·|s)) is the (market clearing) quantity bidder i obtains if the state (bidders’ private
information and the supply quantity) is (s,Q) and bidders bid according to strategies speciﬁed in the
vector y(·|s) = [y1 (·|s1),...,yN (·|sN)], and similarly pc (Q,s,y(·|s)) will denote the market clearing
price associated with state (s,Q), which turns out to be the random variable that is most crucial
to the analysis. The ﬁrst term in (A-1) is the gross utility the type si enjoys from his allocation,
the second term is the total payment for all units allocated at steps at which the type si was not
rationed and the ﬁnal term is the payment for units allocated during rationing. A Bayesian Nash
Equilibrium in this setting is thus a collection of functions such that almost every type si of bidder
i is choosing his bid function so as to maximize his expected utility: yi (·|si) ∈ argmaxEUi (si)
for a.e. si and all bidders i. Part (i) of the following proposition proved in Kastl (2008) provides
necessary conditions characterizing the equilibrium in discriminatory auctions with private values
when marginal valuation function is continuous in q. Since continuity of the marginal valuation
49function might be questionable at the last step (in particular for bidders who submit just one step),
we make use of the necessary conditions for optimality with respect to the bid (part (ii)).
Proposition 1 Under assumptions 1-5 in any Bayesian Nash Equilibrium of a Discriminatory
Auction, for almost all si, with a bidder of type si submitting ˆ K (si) ≤ 10 steps, every step k in the
equilibrium bid function yi (·|si) has to satisfy:
(i) ∀k < ˆ K (si) such that v (q,si) is continuous in a neighborhood of qk for a.e. si:
v(qk,si) = bk +
Pr(bk+1 ≥ pc|si)
Pr(bk > pc > bk+1|si)
(bk − bk+1) (A-2)
and at K (si):
bK = v(q,si)
where q = sup(Q,s−i) qc
i (Q,s,y(·|s)), i.e., the largest quantity allocated to bidder i in equilibrium.
(ii) ∀k ≤ ˆ K (si) such that v (q,si) is a step function in q at step k such that v (q,si) = vk ∀q ∈
(qk−1,qk] for a.e. si and signals are independently distributed:





In practice, we use equation (A-2) to identify the marginal values at all, but last step and we
use equation (A-3) at the last step.55 Note that as K → ∞, (A-2) and (A-3) coincide in the limit.56
A.3 Liquidity demand and supply
To put the liquidity auctions of the ECB into perspective and understand the supply policy of the
ECB, let us ﬁrst look at the simpliﬁed balance sheet of the Eurosystem, for example on June 29,
2007 (Table 7 and Table 8).
On the Liabilities side the main items are Banknotes and Current Accounts (together represent
77% of total Liabilities), the latter including the minimum reserve requirement. On the Assets side
55Using (A-3) at all steps leads to qualitatively very similar results, but the estimates turn out to be less precise
due to the necessity to numerically estimate the derivative of the distribution of the market clearing price.
56The formal argument is in Kastl (2008).
50Table 7: Balance sheet of the Eurosystem on June 29, 2007
Assets Liabilities
1. Net Foreign Assets 325,703 5. Banknotes 630,777
2. Net Assets Denominated in EUR 282,041 6. Current Accounts 194,530
3. Liquidity Providing Open Market Operations 463,501 7. Government Deposits 69,621
4. Marginal Lending Facility 5 8. Deposit Facility 80
9. Other 176,242
Total Assets 1,071,250 Total Liabilities 1,071,250
* Values in million EUR.
Table 8: Structure of the balance sheet of the Eurosystem on June 29, 2007
Assets % Liabilities %
1. Net Foreign Assets 30 5. Banknotes 59
2. Net Assets Denominated in EUR 26 6. Current Accounts 18
3. Liquidity Providing Open Market Operations 43 7. Government Deposits 6
4. Marginal Lending Facility 0 8. Deposit Facility 0
9. Other 16
Total Assets 100 Total Liabilities 100
there are two large items: Net Foreign Assets and Net Assets Denominated in Euro (representing
56% of total Assets). The former relates to foreign exchange reserve holdings of the Eurosystem (in
gold and US Dollar) managed by the ECB. The latter reﬂects the investment portfolio holdings of
NCBs (managed in a decentralised manner according to agreed rules). It is important to note that
this is not a monetary policy portfolio. Liquidity providing OMO represent 43% of the Assets of
the Eurosystem. This is the item that is adjusted/managed by the ECB and relevant for monetary
policy implementation.
The liquidity needs of the banking system can be calculated from the balance sheet as follows:
+ Assets (other than 3 and 4) provide liquidity
- Liabilities (other than 8) create liquidity needs.
Thus:
Liquidity Deﬁcit = Autonomous factors (AF) + Current Accounts (CA).
Where:
Autonomous factors (AF) = Net Foreign Assets (NFA) + Net Assets Denominated in Euro (NDA)
51- Banknotes (BN) - Government deposits (GOV) - Other (O).
Current Accounts include the reserve requirement (RR) plus very small excess reserves (XR).
Example 1 From the balance sheet data (Table 7) we can see that AF = -268,896 million EUR,
and CA = -194,530 million EUR. Therefore the aggregate liquidity deﬁcit in the euro area was
AF+CA=-463,426 million EUR or approximately 463 billion EUR, of which 58% was due to the
so-called autonomous factors and 42% was due to the reserve requirement (current accounts).
Alternatively one could express the liquidity needs as follows (Table 9): Outright portfolio - Re-
serve Base - Other = -463,426 million EUR, where Reserve Base = Banknotes + Current Accounts
and Outright Portfolio = NFA + NDA - GOV.
Table 9: Simpliﬁed balance sheet of the Eurosystem on June 29, 2007
Assets % Liabilities %
1. Outright Portfolio 538,125 3. Reserve Base 825,307
2. Repo Operations 463,501 4. Net Standing Facilities 75
5. Other 176,242
Total Assets 1,001,624 Total Liabilities 1,001,624
* Values in million EUR.
As shown in Table 7 (also Table 9) the ECB provides liquidity to the banking system mainly
via its regular open market operations, which satisfy: 57
OMO + ML - DF = AF + CA. And OMO = MRO + LTRO.
Before the turmoil the MROs represented about 70% of the reﬁnancing and the LTROs only
30%. Thus, the bulk of the liquidity was provided by MROs on a short-term basis (weekly) and was
rolled-over every week. For example, on June 29, 2007, the outstanding volumes in OMO consisted
of: (i) Main reﬁnancing operations (MROs: 313,499 million EUR) and (ii) Longer-term reﬁnancing
operations (LTROs: 150,002 million EUR).
In general, the liquidity policy of the ECB is quantity-oriented even if the objective is to steer
the overnight interest rate. It is a rules-based approach where the benchmark allotment plays a
central role.
57The provision of liquidity via the marginal lending facility is negligible.
52The benchmark allotment in a MRO is the allotment amount which allows counterparties to
smoothly fulﬁll their reserve requirements until the day before the settlement of the next MRO,
when taking into account the following liquidity needs:
• Liquidity imbalances that have occurred previously in the same reserve maintenance period
and which were not anticipated in the preceding MRO
• ECB’s forecast of the autonomous factors
• ECB’s forecast of excess reserves which are assumed to be the same on each day of the reserve
maintenance period
The weekly benchmark allotment is (in simpliﬁed terms) given by:
MRObenchmark = AFforecast + RR + XRforecast + {Forecast error of previous week}
Assuming: ML−DF = 0. The reserve requirement is ﬁxed as it is calculated on a lagged accounting
basis.
The underlying idea of the benchmark allotment is that if the ECB’s forecast errors are unbiased
and the forecast error variance is small compared to the reserve requirement, then the overnight
rate on the last day in the reserve maintenance period should be expected to be close to the middle
of the interest rate corridor deﬁned by the rates on the standing facilities. With a symmetric
interest rate corridor this policy should keep the overnight rate close to the policy rate.
In fact, on the last day of the reserve maintenance period we get the aggregate liquidity im-
balance equal to the forecast error made by the ECB, the former being either a net recourse to
marginal lending (liquidity shortage) or to the deposit facility (liquidity surplus).
ML − DF = Forecast Error
.
If the overnight rate is expected to be close to the policy rate on the last day of the RMP, then
on any other day in the reserve maintenance period it should also be close to the policy rate by
53applying the martingale hypothesis.
Empirical evidence before the turmoil matches these predictions very closely (ﬁgure 14).
Figure 17 shows that the liquidity needs of the banking system evolved very smoothly before
the turmoil between 400 and 450 billion EUR. The MROs had a volume of around 300 billion
EUR and the LTROs about 100-150 billion EUR. Deviations from benchmark were negligible as
illustrated in ﬁgure 18.
Figure 17 further illustrates how the ECB managed liquidity during the turmoil. Four aspects
are shown: i) the total volume of reﬁnancing was kept on trend, albeit with somewhat more
volatility; there was a signiﬁcant increase at the end of the year mainly for seasonal reasons; ii)
there was an increase in the absolute volume and relative weight of LTROs in total reﬁnancing.
However, the volume of MROs declined so that the total volume was kept on trend; iii) the ECB
conducted more frequent and sizable ﬁne-tuning operations (FTOs), both providing and draining
liquidity; the latter (draining) were more frequent and sizable; A ﬁnal aspect is illustrated in
ﬁgure 18: iv) At the MROs deviations from benchmark became very sizable and time-varying
(larger at the ﬁrst MRO in the RMP and somewhat smaller in subsequent MROs in the same
RMP).
54A.4 Long Term Reﬁnancing Operations
We also obtained data on ECB’s LTROs. We have 19 auctions covering 10/2006 to 3/2008. As
described in the institutional background, these auctions are run only once a month and they are
for loans with 3-months maturity. These data are summarized in table 10 and the pre- and post-
turmoil means and standard deviation in table 11. The patterns in general correspond to those from
the main reﬁnancing operations studied in the main body of this paper. The important diﬀerences
are (i) the much starker increase the price bid spread against the EONIA rate following the turmoil
(from 1 to 47 basis points) which is about ﬁve times the increase in the MROs and (ii) the number
of participants is less than a half of those in MROs. This is probably mainly due to the overlapping
maturities of the loans (monthly auction frequency and 3-month maturity) since the set of banks
participating in both types of reﬁnancing operations is very similar. This last observation allows
us to perform the same exercise as in the case of MROs and use the estimated values to classify
bidders into more and less distressed groups. Doing so, we obtain a similar pattern as in the MROs:
only about 2
3 of bidders experienced an increase in their mean (quantity-weighted) marginal value,
while almost all banks signiﬁcantly increased their bid spreads against EONIA suggesting more
aggressive bidding strategy.
Table 10: Data Summary - LTROs
Summary Statistics
Auctions 50
Mean St.Dev. Min Max
Bidders 148 19 96 175
Submitted steps 2.29 1.68 1 10
Price bid 4.20 0.44 3.20 5.05
Price bid spreada 0.26 0.26 -0.48 1.02
Quantity bid 0.01 0.02 1 ∗ 10
−5 0.28
Issued Amount (billions e) 49.74 8.58 40 75
a Spread against EONIA rate.
Following the same procedure as in MROs, we estimated the marginal values that would ratio-
nalize the observed bids in LTROs. We also repeated the same exercise as in the case of MROs to
classify the bidders in LTROs into the distressed and not distressed groups. The results are sum-
marized in table 12. Due to less participation frequency (we have only 11 auction pre-turmoil and




Before After Before After
Bidders 150.6 143.4 10.66 26.53
Submitted steps 1.76 3.04 0.94 2.15
Price bid 3.78 4.55 0.26 0.16
Price bid spreada 0.01 0.47 0.02 0.17
Quantity bid 0.009 0.013 0.024 0.023
Issued Amount (billion e) 46.36 54.38 5.05 9.82
a Spread against EONIA rate.
8 auctions post-turmoil) we were able to classify only 200 bidder identities. Very similar pattern
arises for those, however, as in the case of MROs. Virtually all participants signiﬁcantly increased
their bids, but for 49
189 (or 26%) of those, this does not seem to have been accompanied by an
increase in values.
Table 12: Predicting Poten-
tial Problems - LTROs
Based on Bids
Yes No
Values Yes 140 4
No 49 7

















Figure 13: Distribution of the number of steps in a bid curve before and after the turmoil
Figure 14: EONIA Spread and Liquidity Conditions on the Last Day of the RMP











Histogram of participation frequency of bidders with large coefficients on turmoil dummy
Figure 15: Histogram of Participation by Bidders with Large Turmoil Eﬀects








Histogram of participation frequency of bidders with insignificant coefficients on turmoil dummy
Figure 16: Histogram of Participation by Bidders with Insigniﬁcant Turmoil Eﬀects
58Figure 17: Liquidity Provision by the ECB in 2007
Figure 18: Deviation from Benchmark at the MROs in 2007
59